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End of Life Decision-making, Policy and the Criminal Justice 
System: Untrained Carers Assuming Responsibility [UCARes] and 
Their Uncertain Legal Liabilities1 
 




This article will explore some previously unrecognised legal and ethical issues 
associated with informal care-giving and criminal justice in the context of end of life 
decision-making. It was prompted by a recent case in Leeds Crown Court, which raises 
important issues for the people who care for their loved ones at home and for the 
criminal justice system more generally. Government figures estimate that over 5.2 
million Britons are responsible for the care of relatives or loved ones. In order to 
evaluate some of the ways in which they might find themselves exposed to unexpected 





The relationship between genomics, genetic disabilities, and legal liabilities has been 
most commonly explored in relation to choice in reproduction and services provided for 
the impaired and their carers.2 The intersection between genomics, genetic impairment 
and the criminal justice system has remained relatively unexplored. This article seeks to 
bring to public attention problematic situations which are likely to impact upon an 
increasing proportion of the population. In 2001 Government figures estimated that 
approximately 5.2 million people were providing informal care in England and Wales, 
which amounts to one in ten of the population. These figures exclude parents caring for 
non-disabled children. Such informal carers are not care-workers or staff employed to 
provide care, but people who look after relatives or friends needing care and support 
due to age, infirmity, physical or mental illness or disability. They may be elderly or 
unwell themselves or possibly even under the age of 18 and providing care for an older 
family member.3 Another way of looking at this is that at least another one in ten of the 
population is being informally cared for by an untrained voluntary carer. Such untrained 
carers who assume responsibility for the health and well-being of familial or emotional 
relationships (UCARes4) form the focus of this article.  
 
Inevitably, more of us will be involved in these types of relationships as a higher 
proportion of the population is made up of the elderly. In addition, in general British 
people are tending to live for longer in better physical health, but remain subject to 
mental infirmities induced by genetic susceptibilities, such as Alzheimers. Evidence of 
genomic vulnerabilities and the part played by inherited factors in illness suggests that 
many of us with chronic complaints and impairments, as well as the increasing number 
of number of elderly demented, may be regarded as being genetically compromised and 
in need of continuing care. This matters because, while the responsibilities and legal 
liabilities of professional carers are generally well understood, if things go wrong in the 
informal care setting the cared for may be inadequately protected and UCARes may 
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find themselves exposed to unforeseen legal consequences.  
 
In the UK there has been a long tradition of non-professional caring which today is 
further encouraged by health policy and economics. Care of the elderly, the infirm and 
children, has always taken place within the home, relying on the good will and fortitude 
of genetically related emotional carers.5 UCAREs have traditionally been women, but 
demographic and social changes, such as the increased involvement of women in the 
workforce, have disrupted both the assumptions that underpin the traditional approach 
and the physical resources to provide adequate care. As a result recent decades 
witnessed a growth in institutional care for some types of cared for people, most notably 
the elderly. The proliferation of care homes generated a need for regulation of staff and 
institutions, resulting in increasing costs, which ultimately has led to a rising charges for 
the families concerned. Inevitably tensions have developed between the need for 
outside care and the means to pay for it. In many cases emotional carers find themselves 
financially burdened by the costs of providing institutional care while others seek to 
avoid the financial cost by shouldering the physical responsibility themselves by 
becoming UCAREs.  
 
In the context of end of life decision-making this article will explore some previously 
unrecognised legal and ethical issues associated with informal care-giving and criminal 
justice. Drawing on recent court cases6 involving the care of people with debilitating 
inherited medical conditions we will consider a detailed hypothetical scenario involving 
Alice and Benjamin to illustrate some issues associated with UCARes, end of life 
decision-making and the criminal justice system.  
 
Alice and Benjamin: UCARes and end of life decision making 
  
Alice is caring for Benjamin who suffers from motor neurone disease (MND),7 which is 
a degenerative and ultimately fatal inherited condition. In the terminal phases of this 
condition people often suffer the effects of suffocation and diaphragmatic failure while 
their mental abilities and awareness remain unimpaired. Benjamin does not wish to die 
in this way. Ideally he would choose to be assisted to die before he reaches the terminal 
stages of illness and considers several alternative options, active voluntary euthanasia, 
assisted suicide or suicide. Each will have an impact on the manner of his dying and the 
likely criminal justice implications for Alice as his UCARe.  
 
Active voluntary euthanasia is defined as the intentional killing of another person who 
has requested it and in this case Benjamin might ask Alice to deliberately kill him, to 
spare him further suffering and the pain and distress of the dying process. Out of 
compassion many UCARes have helped their carees to die in this way,8 but the law is 
not sympathetic and mercy killing is clearly prohibited in order to protect the 
vulnerable. Even in the case of medical professionals who have agreed to help their 
patients to die ‘the law does not leave it in the hands of doctors, it always treats 
euthanasia as murder’.9 Some commentators10 have recommended legal reform to 
include a new defence of mercy killing where a carer has been charged with murder for 
allegedly killing a patient at her or his request, but to date the law remains unchanged.11   
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Benjamin’s condition is such that eventually he will be unable to physically commit 
suicide himself and may require, and seek active assistance from Alice. For example, 
Alice might simply hand Benjamin an overdose of medication or may prepare a fatal 
potion at his instigation because he no longer has sufficient motor co-ordination to do so 
himself. However, at present assisting suicide is contrary to the Suicide Act 1961, which 
makes it a crime to ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of another’.12 This means 
that any action Alice takes to help Benjamin commit suicide could result in criminal 
prosecution which, if she is convicted, is punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment. 
Diane Pretty (also an MND sufferer) recently challenged the United Kingdom’s 
prohibition on assisted suicide in the European Court of Human Rights but was 
unsuccessful, despite the fact other European jurisdictions have a more liberal approach 
to assisted suicide.  
 
In the wake of Diane Pretty’s death the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005 
has been introduced to the House of Lords as a Private Members Bill. When originally 
presented in 2004, the Bill included a provision for active voluntary euthanasia in 
certain circumstances but its amended form will allow only assisted suicide. Should it 
become law patients seeking assisted suicide under the Bill will have to meet stringent 
qualifying criteria and a variety of safeguards are incorporated.13 However, at present 
the Bill is still undergoing Parliamentary scrutiny and is by no means guaranteed to 
reach the statute books. It will therefore not help Benjamin if he seeks assisted dying.     
 
While assisted suicide remains illegal in the United Kingdom it is legally permitted 
elsewhere in Europe, most notably in the Netherlands, but people from other parts of 
the world may not lawfully take advantage of this. However, the law in Switzerland 
allows citizens from outside the country to avail themselves of assisted suicide services. 
To date in excess of 70 British nationals have done so and, were he well enough to 
travel Benjamin could join their ranks. Were he to take this option it is likely that he 
would ask Alice accompany him and that she would wish to do so, which might expose 
her to criminal liability.     
 
After Reginald Crewe travelled to Switzerland for assisted suicide accompanied and 
assisted by his wife and daughter the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) deliberated for 
eight months before deciding that their prosecution would not be in the public interest. 
Thereafter the Director of Public Prosecutions was called upon to issue new guidance 
on whether and when prosecutions should be brought in these circumstances, but it is 
reported that there are currently no plans to do so. None the less, it was recently 
reported that the family (UCARes) of Dr Anne Turner, who also travelled to 
Switzerland to receive assisted suicide, have been questioned by police about their 
involvement. No charges have yet been bought.  
 
Given the possibility of exposing Alice to the rigours of the criminal justice system if he 
involves her in either active voluntary euthanasia or in assisting his suicide, Benjamin 
might instead decide to take his own life before he becomes too infirm to do so. Here 
UCARes may unwittingly find themselves in a precarious legal position which has 
hitherto been unrecognised. The remainder of this article will address this issue.   
 
If, in this hypothetical scenario, Benjamin does decide to commit suicide there are a 
range of situations that might give rise to criminal liability for Alice. For instance, any 
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involvement Alice has in Benjamin’s decision to end his life could mean that she will be 
implicated for assisting his suicide as discussed above. Depending on the circumstances 
however, there are other ways in which she could be found criminally liable and it is 
these we now seek to explore.  
 
R v Anderson: UCARes and uncertainties in the law 
 
The recent case of R v Anderson (unreported) Leeds Crown Court April 2005 
exemplifies the position that Alice might find herself in with regard to the application of 
manslaughter by omission involving UCARes. There, like Benjamin, the husband was 
suffering from a debilitating but not immediately life limiting condition, the difference 
being that the husband in Anderson had M. E. or chronic fatigue syndrome. He had 
‘abnormal chronic anxiety’14 about his health, had made repeated suicide attempts and 
been admitted to hospital for treatment on two previous occasions as a consequence. 
Respecting her husband’s wishes, his wife, his UCARe, deliberately failed to call the 
emergency services despite knowing that her husband had taken an overdose of 
morphine with the intention of ending his life. After he died she was tried and acquitted 
of his manslaughter. During the trial it emerged that she had stayed with him throughout 
the night and only summoned help some two hours after his final breath. The central 
issue in court was whether she had a legal duty to act in these circumstances, as the 
existence of such a duty that she had neglected to perform could render her criminally 
responsible for his death. Alice, and other UCARes could encounter a similar scenario if 
their loved ones inform them of their intentions and their desire to commit suicide in 
order to hasten their deaths and to avoid terminal suffering.   
  
In the context of unqualified carers supporting adult dependants at home the junction 
between end of life decision making and manslaughter by neglect is fraught with 
difficulties over the just assignment of legal responsibility. A string of criminal cases 
has addressed a range of factual situations involving UCARes with a variety of charges 
and outcomes.15 Other commentators have identified a certain lack of precision and 
perhaps inconsistency in the application of the law in this area16 but, despite this wide 
ranging academic debate, the uncertainty remains in relation to the group we have 
characterised as UCARes. In addition recent high profile cases concerning medical 
decisions at the end of life,17 may add to the uncertainty of a UCARe over how to 
respond should their charges purposefully put their lives at risk while insisting that they 
would also reject life saving medical intervention. In medical law the autonomous rights 
of competent patients to refuse care18 is revered but in this environment it conflicts with 
the aim of the criminal law to protect vulnerable people from abuse through the offence 
of manslaughter by omission. The tensions between these two related areas of law are 
likely to be beyond the comprehension of an unqualified carer. 
 
It is of course essential that the state protects the interests of those who are unable to 
look after themselves, and manslaughter by neglect is in general an appropriate 
mechanism through which to achieve this. More specifically, where the wrong doer is a 
professional person whose duty to the patient is readily established, criminal sanction is 
the most appropriate response when conduct falls very far below an accepted 
standard.19 Similarly, where a non-professional carer has intentionally caused the death 
of a vulnerable person in their care through deliberate omission,20 a murder charge may 
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even be appropriate.21 Alice is not in this position, but she, and other UCARes, may still 
be unjustly exposed to the potential of criminal conviction because they have assumed a 
responsibility to care for a loved one.  
 
If a UCARe like Alice declines to take action and their charge dies the nature of any 
criminal liability and how far it extends turns on whether or not the UCARe had a legal 
duty to act in the circumstances. There are various ways in which such a duty can 
arise.22 The most likely roots of obligation here are associated with the special 
relationship between spouses and the fact that by her conduct in providing support Alice 
will have assumed a duty to care for her infirm husband. The duty arises under the civil 
law. If the duty is neglected, resulting in death, it gives rise to  criminal liability. As 
Lord Mackay explains; 
 
‘…the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain 
whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care 
towards the victim who has died. If such a breach of duty is 
established the next question is whether that breach of duty caused 
the death of the victim.’23  
 
However, in addition to this, we argue that it is possible to regard UCARes as owing a 
duty to those they care for over and above the ordinary duty of care, that is, a moral 
duty to respect the autonomous wishes of their caree. This moral duty may conflict with 
the established legal duty to preserve life if the cared for person desires to die and 
declines assistance. For example, in Anderson the UCARe asserted that she felt obliged 
to respect her husband’s wish to die and therefore decided not to call an ambulance. 
 
‘I searched my conscience and the act I did that night was for him, 
not me, he wanted to go… what I did that night was an act of love 
and an act of kindness … it was very difficult to face a prosecution 
for loving someone, because that’s all I did that night.’24  
 
In this way Jill Anderson reveals that she believed she owed a higher moral duty to her 
husband, which led her to act in the way she did.25 Nonetheless authorities demonstrate 
that legal liability has been imposed in similar situations in a number of cases despite 
the defendants’ appeal to a higher moral duty. 
 
UCARes and their duty of care 
 
In Nicholls,26 the first case that decided such a duty could arise in the absence of a 
contractual relationship, Bret J directed the jury that, 
 
‘if a grown up person chooses to undertake the charge of a human 
creature helpless either from infancy, simplicity or other infirmity, 
he is bound to exercise that charge without (at all events) wicked 
negligence; and if a person who has chosen to take charge of a 
helpless creature lets it die by wicked negligence, that person is 
guilty of manslaughter.’ 
 
The direction was followed in an array of subsequent cases27 establishing that a duty 
may arise in these circumstances without clearly specifying the parameters of when the 
duty arises and how far it extends.  
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More recently Smith28 confirmed that a husband had a duty to care for his wife’s health. 
In this manslaughter prosecution it was questioned whether a failure to call a doctor in 
the face of the wife’s refusal amounted to a ‘reckless disregard’ of the duty of care. As 
in Anderson, Smith was aware that he would be subjecting his spouse to a serious risk 
to her health if he failed to get help but none the less he acceded to her wishes, resulting 
in her death. In the Anderson case, and in our hypothetical, it is questionable whether 
the UCARe is guilty of ‘wicked negligence’ in these terms because, at least at the 
outset, the caree might not be regarded as a helpless creature. Rather, the cared for 
person could be regarded as an autonomous person refusing future medical intervention.  
 
Assuming that the UCARe becomes aware of the suicide attempt before the caree 
actually succumbs, there is likely to be a point in time where loss of consciousness 
renders them as a helpless creature. It seems clear that ordinarily, even if it could be 
argued that there was no duty in existence up until this point, a duty would arise once 
the caree becomes so ill that death is inevitable in the absence of medical treatment. In 
Smith the judge questioned whether a person who becomes desperately unwell ought 
always to be regarded as a helpless creature for these purposes, even where the ill 
person has objected to medical intervention. However, the matter was left for the jury to 
determine with regard to whether the deceased person could be supposed to have the 
capacity to decide to refuse treatment. Subsequent cases in the medical law arena,29 
where it has been held that even an irrational decision must be respected if the 
individual has capacity, have clarified the role of autonomy and self-determination.  
 
Where the alleged victim has caused his own predicament, as would be the case where 
someone like Benjamin deliberately takes an overdose in order to kill himself, he may 
not represent the archetypal helpless creature and the duty on his wife may therefore be 
different. In this case, Benjamin would appear to be acting on a settled wish to die and 
to expect that his wife would not overrule that autonomous choice. In accordance with 
this, and because of her relationship with her husband, once Alice became aware of the 
inevitability of his death, her refraining from summoning medical assistance would 
seem legitimate if her overriding concern were to be to respect his wish and allow him 
to die and release him from suffering. As the defendant in Anderson claimed, 
 
‘ … of course, I never thought of the consequences for myself, I only 
thought about him.’30 
 
If the UCARe’s duty is constructed according to the ordinary objective criteria and 
Benjamin is categorised as a helpless creature it is plain that Alice would be obliged to 
call for assistance. But, if the surrounding circumstances of their particular relationship 
and his intention to die are factored into the equation, then subjectively her duty is more 
ambiguous. A charge of manslaughter is appropriate where the conduct of the accused 
falls so far below what was expected that a severe breach of duty has occurred, but a 
UCARe like Alice is not necessarily in that position. Instead, in omitting to seek 
medical assistance this carer could be said to have acted according to a higher moral 
obligation owed to the person cared for. 
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UCARes: the criminal justice system 
  
The criminal justice system is concerned with safeguarding against evil intent and 
protecting the innocent and helpless. There are many cases involving manslaughter by 
neglect where clear evidence of evil wrongdoing and deliberate infliction of harm to a 
helpless victim have resulted in appropriate conviction. For example, in Bonnyman the 
husband of a drug addicted woman acted to prevent proper medical examination and 
treatment of his emaciated wife who was described in court as ‘as helpless as a person 
could be to deliver herself from this pit into which she had fallen.’31 The husband 
claimed that he was prevented from seeking help because his wife was ‘stubborn and 
would not let him help her’ but the court found this incredible on the facts and rightly 
determined that ‘the plain duty of the appellant was to have given her aid and treatment 
which he withheld’.32 Bonnyman’s false assertion that his wife refused medical 
intervention could not excuse his deplorable conduct because she was clearly in a 
helpless state and deserved to be cared for by those who owed her a duty. 
 
Although, like Bonnyman, cases involving UCARes concern deliberate decisions not to 
seek medical assistance, they may be distinguished because of the lack of evil intent. 
Here the UCARe acts according to what they regard as a higher moral duty to respect 
the wish of their charge and allow them to die. In addition, as we have argued the 
‘victim’ is not a ‘helpless creature’ but is regarded by the UCARe as a person capable of 
making a rational choice to die and acting upon it. We would suggest therefore that 
where the person is self-determining and committing a rational suicide the ordinary 
principles do not apply. This is in accordance with a view previously promulgated by 
Glanville Williams when commenting on a review of potential reform of the law of 
manslaughter. Confirming that the duty of care is generated by helplessness he stated 
that, ‘the person to whom the duty is owed must be unable to perform it himself …’33 
and also that,  
 
‘[Secondly] the code should preserve the caree’s right of autonomy 
(self determination). No-one should be criminally liable for failing to 
provide an adult with a service he does not want – still less for 
failing to force it on him.’34  
 
The case of Robb35 examined similar issues in a case concerning a hunger striker and 
confirmed that where an adult of sound mind refuses all treatment and nutrition those 
wishes must be respected, regardless of whether the reasons for doing so are rational or 
irrational. The rule applies where the individual is being cared for by professionals since 
the person’s autonomous refusal will absolve the professional carer of responsibility. In 
other words, the carer will be released from any duty owed to the caree. This has 
particular resonance for UCARes who feel a specific responsibility to respect the 
wishes of those they care for, and further informs our claim that the duty of care should 
be interpreted subjectively in these cases. In the fraught medico-legal environment 
where a UCARe fails to summon medical assistance because their charge has declined 
such intervention the position is complex. The UCARe becomes the guardian of the 
caree’s wishes so that the carer is not simply released from the obligations of care but 
sees the omission as actively fulfilling their higher duty. The carer would then be 
effectively saving the charge from the harm associated with overriding their autonomy.  
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In normal circumstances the criminal law would assume that by failing to intervene and 
save a person like Benjamin from the consequences of his suicide a UCARe has caused 
harm. Yet if the caree had a genuine wish to die he would perceive an intervention to 
keep him alive as harmful.36 Those whose autonomous desire not to receive medical 
treatment has been wrongfully overridden have received damages in recognition of the 
harm done to them.37 For some people ignoring their wish to die amounts to a harm 
worse than death,  
 
‘In most instances of homicide death is the harm caused by the 
conduct of the accused. With euthanasia, the indignity of a living 
death in a persistent vegetative state, or the protracted dying process 
associated with terminal disease can appear more harmful than 
death itself.’38  
 
Aside from these issues associated with the establishment of a legal duty of care, before 
a criminal conviction can be secured the prosecution would also need to ascertain that 
Alice’s conduct had caused Benjamin’s death. It was confirmed in Adomako that once 
‘a breach of duty is established the next question is whether that breach of duty caused 
the death of the victim.’39   
 
In the criminal law there is ‘considerable uncertainty over the relationship between 
causation and omissions.’40 On one reading of the facts in this hypothetical scenario, if 
Benjamin dies after Alice omits to seek assistance that could rescue him following his 
suicide, her conduct appears to directly result in her husband’s death. But for her failure 
to arrange medical intervention, he would not have died. However, an alternative 
interpretation suggests that if a duty arises at all, it does not arise until Benjamin 
becomes a helpless creature, by which time his death is inevitable and her failure to act 
has no influence on the chain of causation. 
 
Alternatively, in the context of a UCARe who is responding to the autonomous wishes 
of a person in their charge it is interesting to consider what might happen if Alice had 
summoned help. If Benjamin were to be admitted to hospital before becoming 
unconscious he may well decide to refuse treatment. If, in these circumstances he was 
regarded as competent to make such a decision then, following dicta in recent medical 
law cases,41 his wish would have to be respected. The result would be that he would 
have died. Alice would not have caused his death and would not be liable. A different 
outcome can be anticipated however if Benjamin were to be taken to hospital in an 
unconscious state. Then it is most likely that he would receive emergency treatment 
with the health professionals acting in keeping with their professional and legal duty to 




One way of looking at these facts suggests if a UCARe like Alice prevented the 
administration of medical assistance that could save life they would have caused the 
death and thus be susceptible to criminal sanction. However, from another perspective 
the issue is not so straightforward. Either no duty arises or it does not arise until the 
caree becomes helpless, by which time death is unavoidable and then causation is not an 
issue because her omission, or failure to act, could have no impact. Clearly, as there are 
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so many alternative legal constructions that might apply in this context UCARes can be 
forgiven for confusion surrounding how far their duty extends towards those they care 
for and perhaps for neglecting their duty given this uncertainty. UCARes are not 
benefited by the training or institutional support available to medical professionals and 
are consequently exposed to a greater risk of criminal liability, which leaves them 
vulnerable to charges of manslaughter by neglect. This seems inappropriate given the 
reluctance to bring prosecutions in various situations like death tourism and the possible 
legalisation of assisted suicide for the terminally ill, both of which evidence a shift in 
contemporary notions of what is justifiable.  
 
The concerns raised in this paper may initially appear to be of limited relevance and 
focused on a very narrow point of law, but as they potentially affect around one fifth of 
the population they cannot be regarded as insignificant. Whereas ignorance of the law is 
no defence to criminal liability, uncertainties within the law must be resolved before 
criminal justice system sanctions come into play. The penalties associated with assisting 
suicide, manslaughter and breaches of the duties of care are clear in relation to 
healthcare professionals. Yet the lawful boundaries between UCARes’ duty of care, our 
right to refuse medical treatment and the higher moral duties we feel in relation to our 
loved ones are inchoate and uncertain. Equally, the need for the criminal justice system 
to preserve ‘helpless creatures’ vulnerable to the intolerable cruelties of uncaring 
UCARes is clear. These issues need to be considered in the volatile context of end of 
life decision-making, death tourism and calls for the legalisation of assisted dying to 
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